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Investors significantly reduce their future returns by selecting mutual funds with higher fees, 
allured by higher past returns that do not predict future performance. This suboptimal behavior, 
which can roughly halve an investor’s retirement savings, is driven by two psychological factors. 
One factor is difficulty comprehending rate information, which is critical given that mutual fund 
fees and returns are typically communicated in percentages. A second factor is devaluing small 
differences in returns or fees (i.e., a peanuts effect). These two factors interact such that large 
investors benefit when fees are stated in currency (as opposed to percentages), whereas small 
investors benefit from returns stated in currency. These striking results suggest behavioral 
interventions that are tailored specifically for small and large investors. 
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Nudging Investors Big and Small Toward Better Decisions 
Choosing a proper investment strategy is key to financial health, particularly in an era where 
commonplace defined-contribution retirement plans require individual investors to make their 
own portfolio allocation decisions (Zelinsky, 2004). Unfortunately, most non-specialists have a 
very poor understanding of the basics of investing in mutual funds, and, as a result, they adopt 
strategies that cause their returns to suffer (Barber, Odean, & Zheng, 2005; Elton, Gruber, & 
Busse, 2004) and even jeopardize the possibility of their enjoying a comfortable retirement. In 
this contribution, we address how these negative consequences resulting from lack of knowledge 
can be ameliorated or exacerbated by how information is conveyed to investors. 
Mutual fund investors must weigh a number of factors when making an investment 
decision, including past returns, management fees, fund manager, and risk (Wilcox, 2003). Many 
investors select mutual funds on the basis of high past returns (Barber et al., 2005; Choi, 
Laibson, & Madrian, 2010; Navone, 2012; Sirri & Tufano, 1998; Wilcox, 2003), yet the 
evidence indicates that this is a poor strategy (Carhart, 1997), because differences in past 
performance between mutual funds with similar investment strategies are largely attributable to 
factors that do not predict future performance. For example, due to market cycles and 
fluctuations, identical funds originated on different dates can have dramatically different past 
returns. Nevertheless, investors are allured by past returns and often purchase high-cost funds 
that are unlikely to beat low-cost alternatives. Instead, better returns (after fees) can be attained 
by selecting mutual funds with low management fees (Bogle, 1999; Gruber, 1996; Malkiel, 
1999), because after-fee average future performance is reduced approximately one-for-one by 
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increases in fees (Sharpe, 1991). Unfortunately, many investors either lack this key knowledge 
regarding fees or fail to act on it because of how investment decisions are framed. 
The US mutual fund industry had $14.7 trillion invested at the end of 2012, at an average 
expense ratio of 0.99% a year (Investment_Company_Institute, 2013), even though mutual funds 
with expenses as low as 0.05% a year are available. Thus, there is great potential for improving 
the welfare of typical investors, such as those saving for retirement. Even small increases in the 
weight given to fees, relative to past returns, can lead to significant improvements in investor 
welfare from a behavior change perspective (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). 
 To offer a brief numerical example of the importance of choosing low-fee funds, the US 
stock market produced a total average return of 10.9% between 1970-2013. At zero cost, this 
would have seen a $1,000 investment grow to more than $94,839. Although all mutual funds 
charge fees, funds with expenses as low as 0.05% now exist (for example Admiral shares of the 
Vanguard S&P 500 Index fund). This fee would reduce final wealth to $92,976. A 1% annual 
fee, however, is enough to reduce the final investment balance to $63,665 – a reduction in final 
wealth of $31,174. A high 1.72% fee fund (approximately the most expensive in the US market) 
would reduce the final balance further, to $47,676, which is roughly half the return of the low-
cost fund that is the same product for all intents and purposes. Fees, which are typically assessed 
as an annual percentage of the current investment size, can clearly reduce an investor’s returns 
significantly over the long haul.  
Rather than simple financial illiteracy, one possibility is that investors make poor 
decisions in part because of idiosyncrasies in how humans process numeric information. Indeed, 
these basic psychological factors may help explain why investors favor higher-cost funds. If so, 
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then a better understanding of these factors may spur the development of effective interventions 
to improve financial decision making and financial health. In what follows, we identify two 
interacting psychological factors that serve to shape suboptimal investment decisions, and show 
how the influence of these factors can be ameliorated or exaggerated as a result of the way in 
which information is presented to investors.  
The first psychological factor that we suspect leads to poor investor decision making is a 
difficulty reasoning effectively when information is presented in a rate or percentage format, as 
fees and returns in mutual funds typically are (e.g., fees of 1% a year; +10% expected return per 
year). There is an abundance of evidence that people are poor at reasoning with rate information. 
For example, shoppers prefer offers in which they get 50% more of a product for free than an 
equivalent 33% price reduction (Chen, Marmorstein, Tsiros, & Rao, 2012), even though both 
offers are identical in financial terms. People are no better with fractions. In the early 1980s, a 
fast food chain discontinued its third-pound of beef burgers because consumers thought the meat 
patties were smaller than McDonald’s quarter pounder as the 4 in ¼ is greater than the 3 in ⅓ 
(Green, 2014). In evaluating fuel economy, which is typically expressed as a rate (i.e., miles per 
gallon; MPG), people make systematic decision errors treating the difference between 10 MPG 
and 20 MPG vehicles as equivalent to that between 40 MPG and 50MPG vehicles, when in fact 
the improvement in the first case is 100% but only 25% in the second case (Larrick & Soll, 
2008). In general, people seem to reason more effectively when information is communicated in 
concrete (non-rate) formats (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). In the investment domain, 
transforming percentage fees to a number format can draw more attention to costs (Choi et al., 
2010; Hastings & Tejeda-Ashton, 2008).  
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 To illustrate the difficulties that investors might face when dealing with information in 
percentage format, we asked 1,973 investors across our two experiments the following numerical 
literacy question: 
A stock mutual fund has a return of +10% in year one, and a return of -10% in year 
two. The mutual fund's final value is:  
• More than its initial value    [chosen by 20.4% of investors] 
• Equal to its initial value    [chosen by 33.9% of investors] 
• Less than its initial value    [chosen by 45.7% of investors] 
 
Less than half (45.7%) of the sample arrived at the correct answer, which requires appreciating 
that the geometric mean, not the arithmetic mean, is the appropriate operation for percentages 
and other rate information.  
 The second psychological factor that we suspect leads to poor investor decision making 
is a downweighting of small costs and returns, sometimes labeled the “peanuts effect” (Weber & 
Chapman, 2005). People tend to discount the consequences of repeating actions that incur a 
small cost or lead to a small gain, which can have serious consequences for repeated behaviors 
such as smoking (Loewenstein, Asch, Friedman, Melichar, & Volpp, 2012). In investing, the 
peanuts effect leads to fees or returns in currency units (i.e., presented in dollars as opposed to 
percentages) that are numerically small being downweighted in the decision process. Percentage 
information is so poorly understood that it should not be subject to downweighting (e.g., it is 
unclear to people whether 1% of a million dollars is sizable). 
As we will show, these two psychological factors, poor comprehension of rate 
information and insensitivity to small rewards or costs, interact in surprising ways to shape 
investors’ decisions depending on how much an individual has to invest. When fees are stated in 
terms of currency (as opposed to percentages; See Figure 1) and return rates are presented as 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FORCES BEHIND INVESTORS’ DECISIONS  6 
 
 
percentages, we might expect that smaller investors will be more likely to treat the increased 
costs of higher-fee funds as inconsequential (i.e., a peanuts effect), whereas cost differences will 
be salient to large investors in this format. The effect for large investors has previously been 
established in mutual fund investing (Choi et al., 2010; Hastings & Tejeda-Ashton, 2008), but 
the peanuts effect is novel, with small investors expected to make even worse decisions than in 
the percentage format real-world status quo. 
(a)
(b)
 
Figure 1: Example stimuli in the $1,000 (low-investment amount) conditions of Experiments 1 
(panel A) and 2 (panel B). The default, as in the real-world, is to state both fees and returns in 
percentages. In Experiment 1, fees were either presented in terms of currency or percentages. 
Panel A shows an example where fees are in currency format. Experiment 2 manipulated the 
format (percentage or currency) of returns. Panel B shows expected returns in terms of currency. 
The opposite pattern can be expected when past performance is stated in currency and 
fees are in percentage. When past performance phrased in terms of currency, small investors can 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FORCES BEHIND INVESTORS’ DECISIONS  7 
 
 
be expected to neglect differences in returns (i.e., a peanuts effect), whereas return differences 
will now be especially salient to larger investors in this format. In this case, we might expect 
investors’ poor ability to understand the impact of fees stated in percentages to lead large 
investors to aim for higher returns, whereas smaller investors will be now discount trivial 
differences in returns and make the “wiser” investment decision in this context. 
On the other hand, when both fee and return information is phrased in terms of 
percentages, we might expect that investor behavior will vary little across investment size simply 
because information presented in this format tends to be poorly understood and opaque to 
investors. In summary, large investors should benefit when fees are presented as currency units, 
but suffer when returns are stated in currency units. Smaller investors should show the opposite 
pattern. To foreshadow our results, we observe this three-way interaction. 
Experiments 
In Experiments 1 and 2, participants made a single forced choice between a low- and 
high-fee mutual funds that followed the same investment strategy. The “correct” choice is the 
low-fee fund as fees are more predictive of future returns than past performance (Carhart, 1997). 
For ease of comparing effect size between-experiments, the funds had identical fee/past 
performance trade-offs (a fund with 1% on both fees and past performance, and a fund with 1.5% 
fees and past performance). Usually past performance will range on a much larger scale than 
fees, confounding potential explanations of why investors do not minimize fees. The high-fee 
fund always had higher past performance, which could be the case if S&P 500 index funds were 
initiated on different start dates (Choi et al., 2010). Experiments 1 and 2 each had four conditions 
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resulting from crossing fund size ($1,000 vs. $1,000,000) and format (currency or percentage) of 
either the fees (Experiment 1) or the expected returns (Experiment 2).  
Method 
US-based investors were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk, a paid online 
crowdsourcing platform, which is an effective method for recruiting demographically diverse 
samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) and has been shown to yield results consistent 
with decision making studies in the laboratory (Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013). 
Participants were screened based on the presence of household investments, defined as any 
stocks, bonds, or mutual funds in an investment or defined-contribution account. Participants in 
Experiments 1 (n=1,010) and 2 (n=963) had similar demographic profiles that were typical of US 
investors (see Table 1). The data-collection target was set in advance at n=1,000, in order to have 
250 participants on average per-cell and achieve 99% for a medium effect size. No variables or 
conditions were omitted in the analyses. 
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Table 1: A comparison of participants across the two experiments. 
Participant Characteristics Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Age   
Mean 30.9 31.9 
Standard deviation 10.1 10.8 
Range 18-79 18-74 
Education   
Some high school 0.8% 0.6% 
High school graduate 6.9% 10.2% 
Some college 39.1% 37.4% 
College graduate 53.2% 51.8% 
Gender   
Female 33.5% 38.9% 
Male 66.5% 61.1% 
Percentages question   
Less than 47.8% 43.5% 
Equal to 32.0% 35.9% 
Greater than 20.2% 20.6% 
Portfolio size   
  < $10,000 45.1% 57.9% 
≥ $10,000  < $100,000 40.4% 28.3% 
≥ $100,000 14.5% 13.8% 
 
 
In all conditions and across both experiments, participants were shown a short description 
of two hypothetical mutual funds, labeled Fund A and Fund B, before being asked to choose 
their preferred fund:  
Stock mutual funds combine the money from many investors to buy a variety of stocks. This makes it easier for 
investors to have diversified portfolios. Mutual funds charge fees in return for this service. Mutual funds are devised 
to follow some benchmark of stocks, such as the S&P 500 which is the weighted average return of the 500 largest US 
stocks. 
Your task is to invest [$1,000/$1,000,000] in one of the two mutual funds below. Both funds follow a similar 
investment strategy, but were launched at different times around a year ago. 
Participants who respond with the better answer will be entered into a $10 lottery. 
Below this description of the two mutual funds, a table was shown describing the fees 
and past returns for the two funds (see Figure 1). Participants chose between a low-fee fund, with 
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fees of 1% a year and after-fee returns of 1%, and a high-fee fund with both fees and after-fee 
returns of 1.5% a year. Labeling of Fund A/B as the low-fee fund was counterbalanced in each 
condition. 
The default (as in the real-world) is to show both fees and returns in percentage format to 
participants. In Experiment 1, whether fees were shown in percentages or currency was varied 
across participants, whereas in Experiment 2 the format was varied for returns. As motivated 
above, small investors ($1,000) should make worse decisions when fees are presented in 
currency units, but benefit when returns are stated in currency units. Large investors 
($1,000,000) should show the opposite pattern. 
 
Results 
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Figure 2: Results from both experiments. In Experiment 1, fees were either in 
percentages or currency. In Experiment 2, the format of returns was manipulated. Error bars are 
95% confidence intervals of the mean. 
Experiment 1’s data were subjected to a logistic regression with fund choice (low-
fee/high-fee) as the binary dependent variable, and fee framing (percentage or currency), 
portfolio size ($1,000 or $1,000,000), and their interaction as independent variables. As 
predicted, there was a significant interaction (see Figure 2) between fee framing and portfolio 
size, χ²(1, 1010) = 8.29, p = .004. The interaction was consistent with the two hypothesized 
psychological factors: a peanuts effects in which small investors were more likely to choose the 
high-cost fund (only $5 more on a $1,000 investment) than were large investors, χ²(1, 502) = 
11.11, p = .001, as well as a poor understanding of rate information reflected in no significant 
difference in preference when all information was in percentages, χ²(1, 508) = 0.46, p = .499. 
Experiment 2 was the same as Experiment 1, except that fees were always stated in terms 
of percentages and instead the format of returns was either in percentages or currency format 
(see Figure 1). Although not significant, format and investment amount interacted in the 
predicted direction, χ²(1, 963) = 1.97, p = .161. Following the two hypothesized psychological 
factors, there was again no difference in choices for the percentage conditions, χ²(1, 478) = 0.25, 
p = .618, but a significant effect (this time in the opposite direction, as predicted) for the 
currency conditions, χ²(1, 485) = 6.30, p = .012. 
The effect of format was strikingly different across Experiments 1 (fees) and 2 (returns). 
One way to quantify these contrasting patterns is to evaluate the three-way interaction (study x 
format x investment size) across studies, χ²(1, 1973) = 9.19, p = .002. Although our focus was on 
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this interaction, it is noteworthy that across conditions only 40.8% of investors chose the low-fee 
fund (i.e., made a correct investment decision) with only small investors choosing the low-fee 
fund at chance levels when returns were presented in terms of currency (see Figure 2). 
Both psychological factors were strongly manifested in our results. Across studies, 
response rates for the percentage conditions were remarkably flat across investment size, 
consistent with a poor understanding of rate information. The second psychological factor, a 
tendency to discount small returns and fees (i.e., a peanuts effect) was robust: small investors 
went from choosing the low-fee fund only 27.4% of the time when fees were stated in terms of 
currency to 54.9% of the time when returns were stated in terms of currency. This is a huge 
framing effect for economically identical choices. 
Discussion 
Improving the quality of investors’ decisions is a goal with important economic 
consequences. Previous work has shown that mutual fund investors may benefit from having fees 
reframed in terms of currency (Choi et al., 2010; Hastings & Tejeda-Ashton, 2008). The present 
study adds a key contribution to this result: it is only beneficial for large investors to have fees 
framed in terms of currency. For small investors a peanuts effect leads to even more returns 
chasing than in the percentage real-world status quo. Small investors can be nudged toward 
greater fee-sensitivity, however, if the peanuts effect is instead used to reduce the salience of past 
returns. Nudges tailored to an individual investor’s situation are capable of benefiting investors 
large or small. 
Investors’ preference for maximizing past returns over minimizing fees remains an 
outstanding puzzle in financial behavior. Experiments on slow-moving time-series show that 
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participants are unlikely to learn that high past returns do not predict high future performance by 
themselves (Beshears, Choi, Fuster, Laibson & Madrian, 2013). Successful heuristics from other 
domains may hurt mutual fund investors. Since in the real-world past returns tend to vary over a 
larger scale than fees, any investor who weighs the two cues equally will tend to buy mutual 
funds with high past returns. The present experiments add an important qualification. Even when 
choosing between two funds with identical past return/fees trade-offs, 59.2% of investors chose 
to maximize past returns. The only condition where past returns and fees were given equal 
weight was when past returns were subjected to the peanuts effect. 
The magnitude of investors’ mistakes, and the resultant economic losses, means that no 
single policy is likely to be sufficient. Experiments have manipulated the mandated disclosure 
statement, “past performance does not guarantee future results,” which is clearly insufficient to 
prevent investors from purchasing funds with high past returns (as shown by its inclusion in the 
present experiments), with stronger statements encouraging investors to minimize fees (Fisch & 
Wilkinson-Ryan, 2013; Mercer, Palmiter & Taha, 2010). These interventions increase fee-
sensitivity, but do not prevent investors from chasing high past returns. In this light, our work 
suggests that manipulating the salience of fees or past returns, depending on the investor’s 
situation, may complement stronger disclosure statements. 
A longstanding assumption in economics is that investor biases must be due to a lack of 
access to financial education, or low levels of financial literacy (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011). 
However, numerous costly financial education programs have been initiated with remarkably 
few positive results (Willis, 2011). A recent meta-analysis found that financial education 
interventions have almost no impact on financial behavior (Fernandes, Lynch & Netemeyer, 
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2014). This suggests that nudges may be more cost-effective than education at changing financial 
behavior. 
Real-world investing is more complex than the one-shot task presented to investors in our 
studies. Many real-world investing scenarios are complicated by advisors who may be 
incentivized to sell high-fee products, which may lead to smaller effect sizes if these 
interventions were used in the field. Investors may for example rely on heuristics such as “buy 
what your advisor recommends” (Monti, Boero, Berg, Gigerenzer & Martignon, 2012). 
Encouraging people to seek finance advice and regulating the nature of this advice may prove 
ineffective in improving investor decision-making because financial advisors often reinforce the 
biases of their clients (Mullainathan, Noeth & Schoar, 2012) and many investors prefer to 
manage their accounts personally, and are likely to do so poorly (Barber & Odean, 2000). 
One implication of our results is that a one-size-fits-all policy might not be effective as 
small and large investors may react differently to interventions. Although it would seem 
reasonable to move away from presenting information in poorly understood percentages and to 
instead adopt currency formats, in some cases, such as small investors considering fees and large 
investors considering expected returns, this change should worsen financial decision making. 
Thus, any “nudges” undertaken need to consider the audience. 
Finally, one challenge facing many societies is growing wealth inequality (Piketty, 2014) 
which is a politically contentious and potentially destabilizing issue. Although smarter investing 
decisions alone will not fully address this issue, choosing low-cost investments could by itself 
double the retirement savings of some middle-class investors. Given the potential benefit for 
individuals and society, exploring interventions based on the current findings is warranted. 
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Although these interventions are unlikely to be voluntarily enacted by the industry, they could be 
introduced in a package of behaviorally-informed regulatory measures. The Financial Conduct 
Authority in the UK has begun exploring nudges and other information disclosures to improve 
investor welfare, and other financial regulators may soon follow (Erta, Hunt, Iscenko & 
Brambley, 2013). 
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